



Photo: Szilvia Polgári

With Hungarian pen and Hungarian heart / Conversation with László Gulyás

“In László Gulyás’s company his conversational partner may feel like they have finally come home in an intellectual sense. We listen to him and don’t quite understand how it is possible that the things he talks about and how he talks about them are not evident for every Hungarian wherever in the world they may live. Because it is only appropriate to write Hungarian history with a Hungarian pen, a Hungarian heart and a Hungarian soul. We are not perfect, neither are other nations, but it is not our job to serve our vices on a silver platter to our political opponents. No paradigm shift has taken place in Hungarian history since the transition to democracy, however, if we want to get an objective picture of our past, we have to do something to reach that goal. It is the earnest of our future.”

Professor László Gulyás, Ph.D., *historian, regionalist, management trainer, university professor*

Professor, the most conspicuous aspect of your resume is that you have been conducting research in areas that are quite far from each other. You have publications in the topics of history as well as economics. Why has it turned out this way?

Ever since I can remember I’ve wanted to be a historian. I came out of my first history class in 5th grade knowing that I wanted to become a historian. At university, I majored

in history and geography and I started studying the geographical work of Pál Teleki and I was promptly labeled on the basis of why I want to revive the heritage of such a fascist prime minister. So, the qualifier immediately appeared from the geography angle. In history, I was particularly interested in Benes and the situation of the Hungarian minority, which was still a banned topic in 1990. Then came the state exam in 1991 where the ex-party secretary's wife, who was strongly devoted to the left and was also heading the committee, asked for the delivery of the Marxist topic after I presented my Hungarian and international history topics. I told her that free elections were held in 1990 and Marxism has been abolished. Of course, we had a major disagreement on this issue and she threatened me that I would never be able to teach, that is not in a faculty of humanities. And that's exactly what happened. I started working at the faculty of engineering and began focusing on management and economic sciences. I actually enjoyed it, it is a good thing that as a historian I'm able to organize and have some knowledge of management as well. Another consequence is that I had to work double the amount in the past 20 years, I have two doctorates – one in history alone and another in economic science and to top it all, my habilitation degree is in management. However, it is still a question of the future whether I will ever be able to be the member of a faculty of humanities someday and be a so-called professional historian.

Are you in Szeged now?

Yes, but as a historian I should be teaching history at the faculty of humanities, instead I'm teaching management to future engineers at the engineering faculty. I did get a chance once to teach the foreign policy of the Horthy era as an external lecturer for free, and I did for ten years. However, in 2014 they took my courses away from me claiming that I could no longer do it for free because I was worsening the figures and the faculty of humanities could not allow itself to tip over the teacher-student ratio by employing external lecturers. That was the reason to let me go. Obviously, this was just a pretext; reality is that the leftist liberal team that dominates the faculty doesn't like to have a teacher there who has national-conservative inclinations.

It is one of the main characteristic features of the faculty of humanities at the University of Szeged.

That's right, and the facts speak for themselves: if registration for one of my courses opened at 9 am for 50 people, it got filled by 9:20 am, opposed to some other colleagues' courses for which only two or three students signed up for. So, it is quite irritating for them that since students can choose their teachers freely, it becomes clearly visible who the popular ones are. Although I am strict and I fail students on a regular basis, the room is full even though I don't monitor attendance.

We can say that it's an explicit feedback. We've mentioned the foreign policy of the Horthy era; the fifth volume of your book series with the same title is coming out soon. Let's discuss the era because it has become fashionable both in public discourse and political publications to compare it with the Kádár era. Do you think it's a correctly drawn parallel?

It is terribly wrong, simply foolish, it's enough to look at the beginning of the two eras. Horthy arrived in 1919, pathetically put, he was the savior of the country, he was the man who finally organized an army and restored order in the country. And when he was elected governor in March 1920 the army along with multiple Hungarian politicians and political parties lined up behind him.

He had substantial social support.

Yes, society was also behind him, so we're talking about a legitimate politician. Now, if you compare him to Kádár, and let's put aside that between 1940 and 1956 as minister of the interior he actively participated in the pulverization of the multiparty system, he committed the single most severe sin in 1956 when – putting in mildly – he returned on the tip of the Soviet bayonets. So, nobody supported him, except for the Soviet Union and a very small Hungarian communist group. In fact, the whole country hated him. For this reason, it isn't even valid to compare the *beginning* of the two eras. The other point I would like to make as an economic historian is that despite Trianon and all sorts of economic crises the Horthy era brought about a period of growth for Hungary. For example, Kunó Klebelsberg, the emblematic culture politician of the era, look at all the things he built and established, now compare him with György Aczél who worked in the Kádár era.

Why, he created the TTT⁴⁵...

That's true... But seriously, Klebelsberg and Aczél are not in the same street. It's simply foolish to compare them. By the way, in my opinion the two systems are deliberately washed together. But I don't support this line of thought at all. Not only because it is too liberal, but also because it is an unprofessional approach; an earlier system or era cannot be compared to a later one, you only put contemporaries next to each other. The situation is different, the international and Hungarian climates are different, and society is different.

We will re-visit this topic, but do you think it's possible that they're trying to portray the Horthy era as fascist in order to try to relativize communism?

I do, although the national socialist and fascist ambitions weren't that strong in Hungary. Regardless, the left-wing historians kept talking about Horthy-fascism.

Although the far-right wasn't substantially legitimized.

No, it wasn't, Horthy sent them to prison. Szálasi⁴⁶ spent multiple years in the Star Prison of Szeged, so in light of that, how can you accuse the governor of fascism? It's non-sense.

Has there been a paradigm shift in history since the transition to democracy? It seems that certain hot topics still reflect the presence of a very deep abyss. Do you think that the various approaches within the profession are getting closer to each other, or is the Marxist view of history still very significant?

45 Acronym that stands for the first letter of the Hungarian equivalent of the words Prohibited, Tolerated and Supported, called „Three T's” in Hungarian, it is a product of the communist cultural policy.

46 Ferenc Szálasi (1897-1946) was the leader of the fascist Arrow Cross Party for the final six months of Hungary's participation in World War II, after Germany occupied Hungary and removed Miklós Horthy by force.

In 1948 the communist party gained the upper hand over the world of universities, including historians, but the transition didn't take place in historical science in 1990. Romsics (*Ignác Romsics was a Széchenyi Prize winner Hungarian historian, university professor, member of the Hungarian Academy of Science – editor*) wrote in his book about the transition of democracy that following 1990 nobody was held accountable for the things they had done in the previous system.

So, there was no paradigm shift at all? Will it just literally die off eventually?

It's a good question and there are two answers that can be given. Practically, Hungarian historical science has got into a worse situation at the beginning of the '90s than it was in previously. The fact that the communists who wrote up all sorts of disgusting things were not fired is the least of it, there were people who had taught scientific socialism for twenty years and then, suddenly, in 1990 they discovered their new selves and realized that they were actually scientists dealing with the current events of history and they just had their fancy door-plates updated in the department building. Faculties of 20th century history were flooded with ex-party secretaries and ex-communist teachers. That's how the late party secretaries have become "recognized" professors. And one more very important factor: they've had 40 years of experience with regards to operation and they knew exactly that they needed to occupy the doctorate schools because those are the positions of key importance. The Marxist approach is very much alive to this day, and the national-conservative side is much weaker especially in academic regard. So, in my opinion, no transition has taken place in historical science. Sure, everyone claims to be independent and value-neutral, but in reality, they aren't. And what you've said about dying off – well, they cannot be eliminated because in the past decades they've carefully paid attention to raising the next generation. The doctorate school is of key importance because there are two ways of carrying one's own ideology there. One is via the topic chosen and the other is the student body. If a student is known to be national-conservative, he or she will not be admitted to the program while a representative of the other side will be. The consequence is that they've succeeded in bringing up a young, or rather middle-aged generation who will carry on the "noble" Marxist tradition.

Is it true on a national level, or only at certain universities?

There are exceptions, but at the universities of Szeged and Pécs – I know these particularly well – the Marxist approach is terribly strong to this day and there are very few institutions where professors with a national-conservative mindset have real power to do something substantial. However, regardless of the disadvantage in numbers the national side managed to catch up quality-wise. Look, there are two kinds of historians – good or bad. Obviously, there are good historians on the left as well as those who are a waste of space, and the same applies for the right. Regrettably though, when it comes to granting academic titles, ranks and positions they don't look at who are the good historians, they focus on who belongs to which side. And those who belong to the left are always exceptional and talented, they write fantastic books, while those on the right are incompetent, talentless or create crummy things only.

I try to think along the lines of objectivity. A source is a source and data should be data. Although surely, I know that interpretation makes a difference.

I've seen works that used the same sources yet ended up being opposed to each other. For example, the case of cutting out trees in Sub-Carpathia: the rusyn government of the region started cutting out the pine forests in 1939 in order to create a source of independent income, and the Hungarian government – that wasn't present in Sub-Carpathia at the time – strongly disapproved of the act. Referring to a source, I wrote in my book that the Sub-Carpathian Ukrainians were actually cutting out the forests. A colleague, who I would not name at this time, using the same source as a reference states that it was an unfounded accusation coming from the Hungarian government. You can see from this that even a two-line source can be interpreted in completely opposing ways.

I barely dare ask after this, but what are the cornerstones where the opinions have become immovable and rigid?

The problem is that mostly smearing is going on. The entire 20th century Hungarian history is the subject of a debate. The list is long, let's start with the peace treaty of Trianon, did we or did we not deserve it? Then comes the whole Horthy era...

Even the terminology is problematic, isn't it? Some call it a peace treaty, others a peace dictate.

Precisely. As a national conservative historian, I use the term peace dictate. We don't even have a common vocabulary, so the first step would be to create one. Many people call it a peace treaty referring to the Anglo-Saxon literature where there is no distinction drawn at all; they call it the Hungarian peace. However, I think that due to the circumstances in which it came about, it is a peace dictate.

Yes, the term treaty presumes a type of consensus that carries real or imagined advantages for both parties involved. In case of Trianon we can't talk about such things. And what about the role of Horthy?

The role of Horthy is similarly a topic of debate, for example, was he a statesman who saved the nation, or was he just a soldier of mediocre talent who was at the right place at the right time but kept making one mistake after the other? One side says that he saved the Jews of Budapest; the other says that it's exclusively his fault that the rest of the Hungarian Jews were deported. Or, when the Red Army entered Hungary in 1945, was it liberation or occupation that has taken place? 1956 – who created the revolution? The left-wing Nagy Imre and his group or the youth of Pest? Kádár era: while it started off bloody, people lived relatively well in the happiest barrack, or was it a communist dictatorship with the scoundrel Kádár and can we thank him for our current difficulties? And then we arrive to 1989, one side talks about a plotting out of Nob Hill and claims that no transition to democracy has occurred, the communists merely made a compromise with the next generation, while the other side states that the transition was a big success and how great it is for us now! But we can keep going to 2004, entering the European Union, did we or did we not need it, is it good or bad for us?

From the aspect of a national minimum it would be important that historians use a common vocabulary.

It would be, but we don't. The terminology used regarding the detachment of Transylvania is a good example of what you've brought up. According to the Romanians it was the "unification of the Romanian lands" while the Hungarian historians say that it was detachment, and obviously, as Hungarian historians everyone should use the same expression, even if I go to Romania. But using a clever language trick they started calling it a change of imperium. The term suggests that there is a territory hanging up in the air that belongs to here at one point, then to somewhere else at another point. However, in case of Transylvania this simply isn't true. But it is also unfortunate that lately our own politicians keep calling Hungarians outside of our borders "Hungarian community." It is a language trick rooted in the union, as according to this a community may be one that was born in the same place, like Hungarians, or it can also be a gender-community chosen by the 10th or 22nd gender. So, they mix together a chosen community – that which I am a member of because I want to belong there, with a community that can't help being born to the place where they were born into while somebody re-drew the borders above their heads. For this reason, I use the expression "Hungarian minority" because a minority originates out of something that cannot necessarily be controlled, and does not come about as a result of one choosing their own identity freely. And obviously it is very difficult to reach a consensus with a historian who uses the term change of imperium or peace treaty. Without a common vocabulary, there cannot be a national minimum. Moreover, when this new way of writing history in a post-modern manner comes into play, well I don't know... I have three university diplomas, two doctorates, but I honestly admit that when these people start talking, or when I read from them, I don't understand what they're trying to say.

Perhaps they don't either...

Perhaps. I think historical science has its normal vocabulary, its dates, its political events, but post-modern writing – that I just call *babbling* – is only good for blurring the facts. Not to mention that they research topics that take away the space from meaningful matters. Because if I only have 3 million forints for a research project and one student says that he would like to research what Hungarian women cooked in 1918 in Budapest, and the other says that relying on a French source she would like to research the guidelines the French used when drawing the territorial borders, then obviously I'm going to grant funding, or *more* funding for the latter topic. But currently, money is granted for less important subjects of historical research and writing. Needless to say, if Trianon is already properly written about, then the spectrum can be widened, but there should be a priority so the focus is not taken away from important questions.

Would a common narrative be enough?

Debates would be necessary as well. Today, separate clusters operate by holding conferences, then they write their own books, and neither of the two parties invite people from the other party; or if they do, the invited individual won't show up; or if they do show up, then their own people will see them as traitors. A struggle is going on between the two

sides and the most brutal manifestation of this fight is when I don't list the other party who I have used as a reference. In science, it is very important that if you write something, you need to use the others as references, and there is an astounding story about this. György Litván, author of the book *Oszkár Jászi* published in 2003 took the liberty of not mentioning the book written with the same title by János Pelle in 2001, not in a single line. So, it would be desirable that if I wrote a book about Benes now and somebody read it, they would write a review about it and point out where Gulyás is in the wrong. Instead, they perfectly ignore the other person, as if they don't even exist.

Complete character assassination. Even though history should provide a fundamentally homogeneous, objective narrative not just for itself, but also for politics.

When I sit down to write and elaborate on a topic, then my own personal worldview – that everyone has – should be put in the shade as much as possible, and the facts should be emphasized instead. It's called objectivity. But in Hungary objectivity doesn't work and that's exactly because of the presence of these very well defined, opposing groups. It doesn't matter that many people claim to be "independent", when you sit down and read their works you can clearly see how much they aren't. We've seen it very explicitly when commemorating the anniversary of 1956; one side organized a conference about Imre Nagy, the other about the Young Men of Pest.

Although attempts are made to treat the crimes of communism as equal to the crimes of national socialism, even today many people relativize the former. Where does the professional community stand in this regard today?

The crimes of national socialism and communism should be treated the same way. Stalin created the Gulag, Hitler established the concentration camps, and they both had a party, an ideology, and many things in common. It is a story of a clearly leftist tradition that they regard national socialism to be an issue of the right, while communism was a nice idea, Marx wrote it down well, even Lenin did it well and then Stalin distorted it all. The point of the story is that they are silent about the crimes of communism and only talk about those of national socialism.

Things that are not written down often tend to speak louder. But every death hurts someone; suffering is equally suffering for a Jew and a Hungarian peasant. There shouldn't be a distinction between these two tragedies.

Exactly. For example, leftist historians write about the story when Prónay (Pál Prónay was a Hungarian soldier, viceroy of Leitha. He played an important role in the so-called white terror⁴⁷ and the extortion of the referendum of Sopron⁴⁸ – editor) had three people hung under the window of Horthy in Transdanubia, but forgot to mention how outraged it made the Governor. Or they draw a straight line from Gömbös⁴⁹ to the Holocaust but they don't mention that the most important element of his foreign policy was independ-

47 Acts of violence committed against those who actively participated in or supposed the Hungarian Soviet Republic following its fall in 1921.

48 Following the Trianon peace dictate the city of Sopron was given the right to hold a referendum and decide for themselves whether they wished to become part of Austria or Hungary.

49 Gyula Gömbös (1886-1936) was a Hungarian military officer and politician. He served as prime minister of Hungary from 1 October, 1932 until his death on 6 October, 1936. (source: wikipedia.org)

ence. Sure, he looked for an alliance with Germany, but when he visited Hitler they had serious disagreements. And it definitely didn't look like the situation when Kádár visited Brezhnev and he dictated to him the names of the people who are to be part of the next Hungarian government. During his visits to Mussolini or Hitler Gömbös always represented the interests of Hungary. When he met Kemal during his visit in Turkey he started negotiations about our fantastic horses and suggested that the Turkish buy Hungarian horses. So, he was a prime minister, and a politician first, who was very much involved in economics and from this point of view, I think Gömbös was an important and good Hungarian prime minister. As to the things that had happened in domestic policy, well it's a matter of taste: is he seen as a forerunner of fascism, or a person who wanted a strong Hungary? Not to mention that he was dead long before the Holocaust, but when he became prime minister in 1932 he openly offered an olive branch to the Hungarian Jewry in the parliament. It's written black and white in the minute book of the parliament when he said, "I stand corrected."

Even I remember this minute book.

Yes, and he wanted to cooperate with the decent Jewish people. But there is such a historian who states that while Gömbös indeed said this in parliament, he thought something entirely different. What can you say to this? The same occurs in politics, liberals even doubt the existence of talented people on the right.

The events of the time should not be analyzed as if they took place in a sterile room, but within their own era and circumstances. Nothing can be judged in and of itself, because everything happened in relation to other things, the various nexuses cannot be ignored.

The entire Hungarian political elite was confused. The Anti-Comintern Pact was signed in 1938, following that Mussolini and Hitler were constantly badgering the Hungarian foreign minister to join. In 1939, Hungary indeed joined the anti-Soviet pact and in return the Soviets cut all ties with us in February. Then Hitler and Stalin joined forces in August (*Molotov-Ribbentrop pact – editor*), and the entire situation became incomprehensible for Teleki – *before* the Germans expected us to hate the Soviets, and we complied, *and now* they formed an alliance?! And one more thought about the victims: we have to be equally sorry for those who died in concentration camps and those who died in the Gulag, but regrettably, we even see a war of numbers, and this is the road that we definitely shouldn't walk down on. True objectivity would mean viewing every victim, whether they were Boers, Russians or Hungarians to be what they were, victims. By the way, there were two large waves of Western supporters of communism, the first one included those who viewed the Soviet Union as a shining star following 1945, and those of 1968 followed them. It is absolutely obvious that a leftist historian criticizes Hitler, but holds his pen back when writing about Stalin. This line of thought is still alive today, there are people who openly admit being Bolsheviks, praise the Bolshevik party, Lenin and Stalin and they are there at the universities, lead doctorate schools where they keep slandering the Hungarian nation and Hungarian history. According to Ernő Raffay (*Hungarian historian, politician – editor*) in some universities and at the Academy people commit treason and get paid for it. I find this statement a bit too

strong, and approaching from a positive angle I am going to say that if I am a Hungarian historian, I work in a Hungarian state institution and I receive my salary from the Hungarian Republic then I have to write history with Hungarian heart and Hungarian pen. For example, there is a female colleague who researches how inhumanely “the Hungarian gendarmerie consisting of scoundrels” treated the “poor Serbian partisans.” Well, I think that if the Serbian partisans were indeed mistreated, then a Serbian historian should write about it. Because as a Hungarian, my job isn’t to write history for the Serbians or the Romanians and provide ammunition to Serbian and Romanian politics. Sadly though, it is allowed to write a doctoral dissertation on this topic, it is allowed to habilitate, and what’s more, it is possible to obtain an academic doctorate for abusing Gömbös.

Let us revisit the Hungarian minorities; the Benes decrees are incompatible with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, however, the Slovakian parliament confirmed their inviolability in 2007. For the Czech political elite Benes is the symbol of statehood and sovereignty, which is why they don’t distance themselves from the decrees, from the principle of the Hungarian and German minorities’ collective culpability. It’s the same in the present. What do you think, can our stepping up together in defense of a common cause – the immigration policy of the V4s – change the current situation?

The short answer is no. I say it for two reasons. One is that both the Slovaks and the Czechs, especially the latter ones, respect Benes as their founder of state, so for them it is the same as if we were asked to renounce our king, St. Stephen. The Czechs and the Slovaks will never destroy the nimbus of Benes or Masaryk.

They wouldn’t have to renounce Benes, just this one step he took.

Clearly, but it is one of the three most important acts that he carried out throughout his life. The Czechs and the Slovaks see this the following way: they had created a state that the Germans and the Hungarians then destroyed and annihilated.

Perhaps the lines shouldn’t have been drawn where they were drawn.

Yes, but really, which Czech historian or politician would be willing to admit that “well, in fact we were the ones who erred because we were just too greedy and chose to disregard the ethnic boundaries?” In order to step up together and fight the immigration policy of the EU jointly, Hungary and Slovakia would have to put shoulder to shoulder. However, that would leave us in a disadvantageous position, because the cause of the Hungarian minority only matters to *us*; and this is the second reason. If we brought up the questions of Benes decrees to the Slovaks a crack would occur in the system of our joint action, so if we want to march ahead with the Slovaks then we just have to put the divisive topics aside. The problem in the Carpathian basin is that due to the first and second decisions of Vienna and the march into the Southland there are certain injuries present in the souls that result in fear of the Hungarians and all Hungarian aspirations. What does a Romanian historian say? On December 1, 1918, the Romanian lands were unified. Therefore, his fundamental starting point is that Trianon was fair and just.

It would have been fair and just if the state borders had been drawn along the ethnic borders, and if referendums had been held in these regions.

They will never admit that.

Is there a chance that Hungarian minorities across our borders will ever attain any form of autonomy? What do things look like today and what can be done in order to achieve it?

I would like to say yes, but if we look at the question objectively, I think four criteria would have to be met all at the same time. First, the minority in the given country would have to carry significant weight and would have to live in one geographical cluster. Out of the three minorities, this requirement is only met in case of Székely Land, in Slovakia there is only a thin belt that is not a cluster, and in the Southland the Hungarian population is continuously decreasing. The second criterion is that the Hungarian minority that would like to achieve autonomy should be unified. But unfortunately, Hungarian minorities across the borders mirror the fault-lines of domestic politics in Hungary. It would be very important not to break up into parties because it results in the lack of unity. The third condition is that at least a small fraction of the majority elite in the given country would need to understand that the easiest way of handling the Hungarian question is by granting them autonomy. South Tirol, by the way, is a good example, because on the one hand the Austrian State backed it up, and on the other, it was necessary to have one or two Italian politicians as well who supported the autonomy. Regrettably though, I haven't yet seen a Romanian, Slovakian, or Serbian politician from the right, or from the left, or from the liberal side (the country has already had virtually all kinds of leadership), who would have stood up and dared say that we should give autonomy to the Hungarians. Finally, the fourth condition is that the all-time Hungarian government must stand up firmly for autonomy. And we know it more than well that the leftist governments have shown no interest whatsoever in the support of the minorities.

Except for the present campaign rhetoric regarding the language law of Sub-Carpathia⁵⁰.

Yes, but like you said, it is nothing more than campaign rhetoric. Overall, I only see a faint hope for independence in Székely Land, but even there the parties are very much divided. But there is absolutely no hope in Serbia and Slovakia. And it is also plain to see that both the European Union as a community, as well as each individual member state are completely indifferent towards this matter.

To get back to your book series about foreign policy, are you going in a chronological order?

Yes. When I started writing I planned to finish in four volumes, but people only realize what they need to write more about when they are already in the process of writing. At the moment, it looks like I will finish at seven volumes. Each volume is organized chronologically and along logical units, for example, the foreign policy of Teleki is one unit, Gömbös is another and so on. But there was also a practical consideration in that the

⁵⁰ Before this law, minorities in Ukraine were allowed to study all subjects in their mother tongue during their school years. This new piece of legislation takes away this right as it only allows minorities to learn in their mother tongue until the first four years of elementary school.

volumes come out one by one annually, so the amount of text is more easily digestible for the readers. We'll see what the response will be like.

Is this work a gap filler?

My colleagues have properly elaborated on some of the subtopics, but the last time a book that reviews the foreign policy starting from Horthy leaving Szeged all the way until he resigns was published in 1986, so in this sense my series can be considered a gap filler, indeed.

Are you closing the last volume with the occupation of Hungary?

You see, it is a very interesting professional question and it sheds some light on how near history and politics are to each other. From a political standpoint, the Monument of Occupation represents the end of the independent Hungarian State because the Germans entered and an occupied country obviously doesn't have an independent foreign policy. So, if I were a comfortable historian, I'd say that the Horthy era ended on March 19. However, if I look at it from a professional angle, then I have to write it all the way until the middle of October, when Horthy was captured and deported. So, for a politician the era ended in March, but for a historian it ended in October, but there are historians who say that the Parisian peace treaty of 1947 was the closure. Unfortunately, in historical science it hasn't been clarified yet how to identify the starting and ending points of an event or an era. How long has World War I lasted for Hungary? Until the truce of Padua on November 3, 1918, or until Trianon on June 4, 1920?

What do you expect from historians upon the hundred-year anniversary?

I'm sure that the battle will become even fiercer; the discourse about conflict and dividedness is likely to escalate further.

Can it bring about a level of clarification?

Ideally, there would be some kind of national minimum, and a new Trianon story would see the light of day that would hopefully be written with Hungarian pen and objectively – as much as the boundaries allow it. But it's not going to happen. Many books will be published which will belong to one of three major categories. The interpretation of the left will say that Trianon is our just punishment for the dualistic era and we deserved it for mistreating the nationalities. Needless to say, the writers and groups who represent this approach will declare themselves to be *mainstream*. They will be the official academic historians. They will claim at every possible platform that what they write represents a high level of professional standard and everyone else aside from them is a scamper and a nationalist.

Although the law concerning nationalities in 1868 was very liberal and it was very much ahead of its era.

That's right. The other narrative will be ours with the title, *The story of the peace dictate of Trianon – with Hungarian pen*. I will organize a group of 30-40 scientists consisting of historians, regionalists and geographers who will write this aspect in three volumes. Let me call particular attention to the expression „with Hungarian pen” which in my

interpretation means that a Hungarian historian must write the story of Trianon from the Hungarian perspective. Unfortunately, that Hungarian socialist type of writing history that says, „let's be careful not to offend the national sensitivity of neighboring people” is still with us today. We have to forget about this approach and we have to write about what happened. Let's call the detachment of Transylvania that happened in December 1918 detachment, not change of imperium, an expression that muddies the waters and shifts attention away *exactly* from the essence of what had happened. The third narrative will belong to the far-right. It will cause serious damages because they will start talking about Jewish conspiracies and Freemasons. And the left will shoot at them, but since they always mix us, conservative-national historians with them we will also take hits.

*Just like it happened in 2006.*⁵¹

Precisely, when they pushed the rioting minority on the neck of the people who were peacefully walking home from the commemoration and then they started hitting people with blades, including senior citizens and mothers.

51 Following the election in the spring of 2006, Ferenc Gyurcsány, socialist prime minister held a speech behind closed doors in Balatonőszöd during the fall, which was made public by an unidentified source. In the memorable talk he called Hungary „this fucking country” and he admitted that during the campaign the party published falsified data regarding the state of the Hungarian economy. A series of demonstration started following the speech demanding the resignation of Mr. Gyurcsány. Demonstrators stormed and damaged the headquarters of the Hungarian National Television on 18 September. The situation reached its climax on October 23 – it was the 50th anniversary of the revolution of 1956 – when the radical and violent crowds were physically pushed onto the peaceful crowds who were walking home from the commemoration gathering organized by Fidesz, then in opposition. All this happened on command of the higher leadership. The police, wearing no identifying tags at the scene, indiscriminately beat everyone in the mixed crowd, among others rubber bullets were used that caused serious eye injuries. Nobody has been held legally responsible for the events ever since.